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Abstract 
The paper examines some of the challenges posed for the central bank governance model in the new unorthodox normality. 
While significant progress has been made debating conventional ideas about central bank orthodoxy, issue like institutional 
adaptation of central bank governance modelto better face the new reality is still subject to consideration. Can adaptation improve 
the overall quality of the governance model? This article suggests first, that adaptation calls forrebalancingkey functions without 
leaving aside two of much-prized features achieved in pre-crisis era of conventional consensus: maintaining price stability and 
independence; second, that adaptation requires innovation to prevent the governance model disruption and to boost public 
perception of the central bank. 
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1. Introduction 
The recent crises and the risk for the stability of the European Union (EU) have underlined the interdependence 
among EU economies and exposed the weaknesses and vulnerability of Member States (MSs), in particular inside 
the euro area. Fiscal discipline, competitiveness gapsand private sector imbalances are also a matter for the EU as a 
whole. This is why there is a need to establish stronger economic governance in the European Monetary Union 
(EMU). At the core of the new approach is a framework for enhanced cooperation and co-ordination of 
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MSs'economic policies built on widened country surveillance which covers all relevant macroeconomic and 
structural policy areas in an integrated fashion.This paper discusses the reaction of a national central bank member 
of the European System of the Central Banks (short, NCBs) to these challenges mainly from the perspective of the 
impact observed at the level of the central bank governance model. The governance model is here identified with a 
conservative central bank (Rogoff-type central bank) (Rogoff, 1985), characterized by: a sole primary objective- 
price stability; principles of operational, financial, personal and institutional independence; tasks and functions 
guaranteed by the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFUE) and secondary legislation; the 
European Central Bank (ECB) and the German Central Bank (Bundesbank) are used as institutional sources of 
reference for this type of central bank governance model.  
The overall purpose of this article is to investigate why (the purpose) and how (the mechanism)some of the 
central bank key functions need to adapt to the new unconventional times by rebalancing their institutional profiles 
in such a way to boost more actively the institutional quality and the overall governance performance. However, for 
a holistic view of the NCBs governance model a deepassessment of these functions need future consideration.  
This paper is organized as follows: section 2 discussesmain challenges posed for the NCBs governance model in 
the new unorthodox normality which could possible disruptthe institutional profile of some key NCB 
functionsSection 3 describes the mechanism of institutional adaptation and delivers the practicalities of 
theseinstitutional disruptions; it raises arguments in favour of rebalancing two keyfunctions by reviewing some 
empirical evidence from studies examining similar institutional and policy issues that should be preserved in the 
unorthodox times.Next section elaborate on why promoting ex-ante coordinationthrough cooperation with national 
and European shareholders should be a purpose for institutional adaptation.Section 5 deals with the institutional 
determinants for improving the central bank institutional quality, as a solution for fixing the mismatch between the 
need to improve public perception and the reluctance to allow a higher degree of transparency.Section 6 concludes 
about the importance of innovation for preventing the NCBs governance model disruption and fragmentation. 
2. Discussing main challenges for the central bank governance model 
The 2008 global financial crisis spurred a series of financial sector governance reform in the European Union to 
complete its Economic and Monetary Union, culminating with establishment of Banking Union (BU), jointly 
supervised, regulated and invested with the authority to shut down failed banks and to provide deposit insurance to 
prevent banks run. Similarly, in the field of the future fiscal union, the ongoing European debt crisis has triggered a 
series of reforms pushing the EU leaders to build from the scratch their crisis-fighting capacities and bail out 
institutions: the European Financial Stability Facility and subsequently the European Stability Mechanism, the 6-
pack and the 2-pack legislative packages, including the European Semester aimed at the introduction, at the 
European level, of a comprehensive economic and fiscal policy planning cycle to reform EMU, and, ultimately, to 
ensure tighter economic coordination and stricter budgetary discipline in the EU (Amtenbrinck, 2012, 2014). 
2.1. From fiscal dominance to expectations dominance 
The challenges and pressures these EMU reforms posed on the NCBs have intensively been discussed in the 
academic literature much more in terms of economic, monetary and financial implications rather as an issue of 
adaption of the central banking principles or the central bank governance model to better face the new realities.  
Carujanatalked about the changing nature of these challenges for the central bank independence, saying that “in 
current circumstances, we need to broaden the concept beyond insulation from political pressures, including “fiscal 
dominance’ to include insulation against pressures from financial markets and indebted agents (“financial 
dominance”) and against unrealistic expectations of what central banks can do (“expectations dominance). Central 
banks should be in a position to normalize policy without being unduly constrained” (Carujana, 2013, p.1). So far 
the academic debate has exanimated systematically the first two categories of dominances mostly from an 
overburdened monetary policy perspective concluding that an independent monetary policy is not suitable for 
structural and labour policies, for fiscal reforms or for stronger capital buffers, therefore, overreliance on an 
independent monetary policy is bound to disappoint politicians expectations. This article deals with the third 
category of “expectations dominance”, from another angle than analysing expectations of the future path of the 
policy interest rate. Thus, in sections 4 and 5, expectations are seen as a driver of innovation and a multifaceted 
concept of public perception in which (i) individual facets are defined by a variety of potentially conflicting tensions 
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between national and supranational (European) levels, and (ii) the overall effect of this type of dominance causes a 
fragmentation of the NCB governance model. Furthermore, it shows that even when conflicting tensions are 
expected or signs of fragmentation are perceived, the NCB governance model can adapt inside through innovation. 
2.2. The central bank independence – why it is still necessary in 21st century 
With a history of “only” three and a half centuries virtually considered too short in comparison with other state 
establishments (Ferguson, 2013), NCBs were initially chartered to lend the government funds, or to act as a clearing 
house for commerce, or to stabilize the currency after episodes of hyperinflation and then to aid in government 
finance. The 20th century brought in a radical change of vision, especially in its last three decades when studies of 
Kydland and Prescott (1977), Calvo (1978), Barro and Gordon (1983) and Rogoff (1985) about the central bank 
independence were initially echoed in the academic world and only afterwards being largely implemented in the EU. 
The first attempt to create economically and monetarily integrated Europe is mentioned in Barre’s Report of 1969 as 
a need for a “greater co-ordination of economic policies and monetary cooperation" (Fratianni, vonHagen& Waller, 
1992, p.3). Then, the 1970’s Werner Plan became the blueprint of EMU in three stages. Negotiating and formalizing 
them as basic principles of the EMU in the Delors Report, in 1989,was not only the victory of the Deutsche 
Bundesbank model, which proved to safeguard independence and fight against inflation,but also increased the 
influence of Germany -“German authorities faced the risk of having to accept higher inflation when they entered 
monetary union. In order to reduce the risk, they insisted on creating a central bank that would be even more ‘hard - 
nosed’ about inflation than they were themselves.” (Grauwe,2005, p.168). No other principle that governed central 
banking in the course of its history has turned outthe necessity of gaininga consensus between external and internal 
priorities, in order to allow a NCB to contribute to the management of national macroeconomic policies and to 
optimize its relationship with national and international financial institutions, even when 
an expansionary fiscal policy couldincrease the influence of political authorities. 
Although hardly accepted by politicians, the NCB independence can be considered one of the greatest 
achievements of the European central banking in the 20th century, leading to increase its influence and credibility in 
the international financial world. But what makes today the concept of independence unique and tolerated by 
politicians is the flexibility with which the NCB governance model accepts and adapts to innovation as an ultimate 
solution for improving the effectiveness of its transmission mechanism both inside and outside the euro area, i.e. the 
whole EU level; innovation is seen here in terms of thinking-outside-the-box wider perspective, which means a 
flexibility of the conventional wisdom framework defined prior to the crisis by a consensus in the following areas: 
(i) monetary policy should focus on inflation and prudential policy should focus on financial stability, (ii) central 
banks should not take credit risk, (iii) safety net to cover banks should not be extended to non-banks, (iv) bubbles 
should not/could not be taken into account in monetary policy.Flexibility is seen now in terms of unconventional 
measures created inside the NCB governance model in terms of both policy instruments and institutional adaptation 
with the purpose of highlightingthe central bank ability and capacity to deal with deflationary pressures provided by 
the zero lower bound for interest rates.  
A couple of examples about the flexibility insidethe governance model are illustrative in this respect: (i) in the 
last two decades of the 20th century, even if NCBs kept the conventional wisdom trend, they innovated 
predominantly the policy of transparency, communication and accountability, before and after the crisis; (ii) once 
the first financial crisis effects from the first decade of 21st century occurred, innovation has touched the basic 
elements of the NCB governance model adding, one by one, new unconventional policies, institutional framework 
and instruments: “keeping the policy rate near zero, attempting to manage expectations actively (forward guidance), 
expanding central banks’balance sheets by purchasing long-term government bonds and risky assets, and 
introducing schemes to facilitate bank lending”-just to mention some of them (Lambert, Ueda, 2014, p.3). Thus, 
what strengthened the credibility of the NCB independence doctrine in the politicians’ eyes was the NCBspower and 
ability to innovate inside its own governance model in critical moments when infectiveness 
causesdisfunctionalitiesof transmission mechanism and inefficiency (or loss of internal productivity) 
reflectsdisruptions at the level of some key functions. 
In conclusion, the NCB independence in unconventional times is still necessary at the beginning of the 21th 
century mainly in the same institutional format and for the same purpose with conventional times: formulating and 
implementing monetary policy and its ability to use the basic monetary tools such as controlling money supply, 
setting interest rates, and reserve requirements in order to achieve the objective of maintaining medium term price 
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stability. “Today most central banks are independent, headed by non-elected officials, and quite powerful. This set-
up is acceptable only if independence is limited by the mandate. That’s the framework the legislators have given us 
[…]. That is why we are so keen about respecting the mandate, because that’s the true guarantee of our 
independence, which […] is crucial for our credibility. And credibility is essential for delivering price stability” 
(Weidmann, 2013, p.2, quoting Draghi, 2013). 
2.3. Delivering on a sole primary objective but being grounded in economic reality 
So far, in the era of central bank orthodoxy consensus, the European central banking have deliveredsome 
pragmatic notable results: (i) the ECB and the NCBs institutional, functional, operational and financial 
independence is enshrined in the TFUE and they do not answer to any national and European government, (ii) the 
NCBs governance model follows closely the Bundesbank governance model and its historical fight-against-inflation 
pattern; this was considered a triumph of deliberations within the Delors Committee (Committee for the Study of 
Economic and Monetary Union) set up for the establishment of the EMU; (iii) the ECB and the NCBs may exert 
tremendous power as they are capable to influence (and affect) financial markets in real time, (iv) the ECB president 
and the NCBs governors may induce European and national leaders the need for prioritizing reforms. After the crisis 
emerged, maintainingmedium term price stability status quo as a similar sole primary objective for all NCBs 
remains of the utmost importance to understand the course of monetary policy stance and decisions. “Delivering on 
their mandate is the only way for central bankers to maintain public trust” (Draghi, 2013).However, NCBs in 
unconventional timesneed to remain credible and become creative since “policy requires an understanding of theory 
but must be grounded in economic reality if it wants to be effective” (Isarescu, 2012). In other words, a successful 
NCBcould continue focusing on preserving the similar link between a tightly coupled sole mandate and its 
independence from political control; but it could do considerably more on rebalancing itskey functions or innovating 
in terms of institutional quality, in order to prevent the governance model disruption. 
3. The mechanism of institutional adaptation of the central bank governance model- rebalancing its key 
functions 
The purpose of this chapter is to look inside a NCB governance model and to detect main institutional causes of 
possible fragmentation starting from conflicting tensions, disfunctionalities and disruptions that affect the most two 
interconnected NCB functions: supervisory function and financial stability function. Prior to the crisisthe monetary 
orthodox framework was defined by: (i) central bank independence, (ii) sole primary objective–maintaining price 
stability in the medium term-, and (iii) inflation targeting regime (Singleton, 2009, 2011, p. 278)whereas the central 
bank orthodoxy was centered on four characteristics: (i) stability-oriented monetary policy framework, with interest 
rate as its only policy instrument, (ii) a very small balance sheet, (iii) independency, as a condition necessary for 
anchoring inflation expectations, and (iv) “the great moderation”, the overarching outcome of efficient and wise 
monetary policies (Noyer, 2012, p.1). After the crisis, things have changed in response to the new 21st 
centuryunorthodox realities.It would go beyond the scope of this paper to discuss the substance of these changes in 
any details. Instead, we offer a different perspective of approaching these new changes, by proposing first to analyse 
the mechanism of institutional adaptation at the level of two key central bank functions and second to show that an 
effective way to rebalance these functions is to develop the European dimension within the NCB governance model: 
3.1. The supervisory function adaptation between its national and European dimensions  
In the current unconventional timesthe need for a longer term vision on the future of the EMU should be a 
priority in order to give a sense of direction to the actions necessary for MSs to tackle current challenges. This 
section discusses below some of these actionsand the mechanism of institutional adaptation to improvefunctioning 
of and to better face the current challenges for banking supervisory function: 
 Developing a macro-prudential perspective inside NCB is not an easy task for a soleprimary objectiveoriented-
NCB, as it requires a number of changes of its governance model for reducing the probability of (re)appearance 
financial crises. Prudential policy has kept central bankers’ attention even before the '70s, but in more general 
terms, and for the purpose of monitoring banking sector to ensure financial stability, systemic orientation of 
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regulation and supervision linked to macroeconomic policies. During the last four decades, within the BIS 
framework, Crocket (2000) and the NCBs governors promoted and encouraged a strengthening of cooperation 
and exchange of information among national supervisors for a better cross-border crisis management. In the 
1986 BIS Report is stated the need for a macro-prudential policy aimed at supporting “the safety and soundness 
of the broad financial system and payments mechanism” (p.2). Human beings have not changed over the 
centuries.“If the financial system has a defect, it is that it reflects and magnifies what we human beings are like. 
Money amplifies our tendency to overreact, to swing from exuberance when things are going well to deep 
depression when they go wrong.” (Ferguson, 2011, p.13). The inability to foreseen the gravity and magnitude of 
this crisis pushed European leaders to go further to coordinate and integrate their financial, fiscal and economic 
policies within the EU framework, respecting the integrity of the single market and of the EU as a whole.  
Since the beginning of crisis, they have contributed to strengthening financial stability in the European banking 
sector through different complementary actions: (i) measures to allow for more integrated banking supervision 
(by establishing three European supervisory authorities; in addition, since November, 2010, the European 
Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) has been tasked with macro-prudential oversight of financial system within the 
EU); (ii) strengthening the banking sector by securing better capitalization, facilitating banking sector 
restructuration and offering more protection to bank depositors; (iii) other additional measures to strengthen 
Europe’s financial sector (such as increase protection for banks deposits, for financial firms, and for improving 
crisis management in the banking sector). The first category of actions tackled the synergies between monetary 
policy and macro-prudential policy as the later used to contribute to the maintenance of a stable monetary 
transmission mechanism in orthodox circumstances and now mitigates risks to price stability emanating from 
systemic imbalances. The main idea behind the European decision-makers was to get macro-prudential policy 
addressing pro-cyclicality and price bubbles. That explains why among the first ESRB recommendations 
referred toassuming the macro-prudential mandate by national competent authorities including guiding principles 
on core elements. According ESRB, the macro-prudential key legal objective is twofold: acting pre-emptively 
with policy tools to lower the probability of a materialisation of systemic risk(risk prevention); and ensuring the 
resilience of the financial system so as to mitigate the impact of a materialisation of systemic risk (risk 
mitigation). “A clear lesson from the crisis is that financial stability has a macro-prudential or systemic 
dimension that cannot be ignored” (Carujana, 2014, p.2). 
 Developing a European dimension of the NCB supervisory function: the national supervisory authorities proved 
to be quite weak to face the current challenges given their role limited mainly at overseeing the functioning of 
national supervisory systems; therefore, the EU decision-makers have been putting forward the concept of a 
Banking Union (BU).BU is a political vision for a deeper economic integration, which is expected to 
complements the current UEM by strengthening the regulation and supervision of the European banking sector: 
it is conceived as a three-stage process involving a single bank supervisor, a single resolution authority and a 
single deposit-guarantee scheme; hence, by entering into force of the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) at 
the beginning of November, 2014, the European decision-makers created conditions for emerging a banking 
supervision at EU level, fully separated by the monetary framework but still integrated within the ECB 
governance model. The specific legislation states clearlythat (i) monetary policy function remain distinct from 
supervisory function and (ii) the NCB mandate and objectives for monetary policy remain equally unaffected by 
the consolidated supervisory function newly conferred to the ECB, despite the inter-linkages between macro-
prudential, supervisory and monetary policies.Separation the single monetary policy of the single consolidated 
supervisory function is a challenge without precedent for a European institution. A successful implementation of 
the SSM depends on the ECB ability to strike the balance between its major functions (monetary policy function, 
financial stability, and now consolidated supervision function) and maintaining the central bank independence as 
a whole, in order to deliver the expected price and financial stability policies to all national competent authorities 
united under one roof. While there is not agreed framework in favor of a clearseparation (or taking on)of 
supervisory role and central banking (Goodhart and Schoemaker, 1995), the balance of arguments have been 
changed over the last couple of decades. Goodhartet all (1998) consider that there is no optimal response to the 
question of where the supervisory function is better allocated. For the ECB governance model, there will be no 
automatic separation and no possibility of separation since the only one available option under the current legal 
frame of the Treaty is to manage all functions under the same institutional roof. In the next years, once the UB 
will become operational in an effective way, a rational option meaning a de jure separation of the two functions 
in order to secure the ECB independence will call for the Treaty change. Some studies (Masciandaro et all, 2011) 
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shows that, if the process is not realistic prepared, carefully set up and effectively monitored by specific 
instruments and mechanisms, then extracting the consolidated supervision function and assigning it to a newly 
established European institution, sooner than conditions are created, can becomepoliticallyrisky. Furthermore, 
European political leaderswould expose themselves to exogenous factors, difficult to control by politicians 
themselves. Therefore, in order to manage the linkage between political risks and institutional reforms in a 
coherent manner and under a fragile and transitional context, the challenge of separation–including the effective 
delivery of two independent institutional settings- is not so much about what has to be done but how: (i) by 
assessingrisks and threats to the European financial stability, in particular those generated by inappropriate 
macro-economic policies at the European and national levels, and (ii) by facilitating quick access to a broad-
based collection of data across the banking sector, and, if needed, extending down to the individual level of both 
European and national financial sector.  
3.2. The financial stability function adaptation - cohabitation with two objectives of stability? 
A monetary policy effectively geared towards maintaining medium-term price stability contributes to financial 
stability by reducing inflation-related distortions occurred in financial system and economy (Isarescu, 2014). Still, 
conflictual issues between the two policies may arise in the short run (Mishkin, 2011). For instance, there might be 
situations where financial system conditions suggest an accommodative monetary policy, while the outlook for the 
risks to price stability would suggest otherwise. Introducing a new policy orientation in the overall framework has to 
be done in such a way to raise the potential for synergies among them or to minimize potential conflicts, but without 
jeopardising each policy’s main goal.Besides, the nature of any links and dependencies between monetary, macro-
prudential and financial stability policies differ between normal times and periods of crisis. The popular “Jackson 
Hole consensus that prevailed before the crisis: financial stability concerns are taken into account by the monetary 
authority to the extent that they affect the outlook for price stability and economic activity” (Smets, 2014, p.269) has 
changed now by considering financial stability as a part of the key objectives in the monetary policy strategy. And 
then, one of the legitimate questions asks whether a NCB could better deal with one or two primary objectives (price 
stability and financial stability) while each have clearly assigned their own instruments: the short-term interest rate 
for monetary stability, and macro-prudential tools for financial stability. Are indeed monetary and financial stability 
“two dimensions of the same public good or two separate public goods”? (Carujana, 2014, p.1) The answer becomes 
overly complex once it targets a holistic approach: (a) from the policy-issues perspective, Smets (2014, p.294) 
argues that “financial stability and price stability are so intimately intertwined that it is impossible to make a 
distinction”; therefore, “because of threats of financial dominance, the coordination of monetary policy with 
financial stability policy is crucial” (Smets, p.294); (b) from our institutional perspective, of analyzing the 
adaptation of central bank governance model to face the new realities, the link mainly refers to the European 
dimension persistently developed after the crisis, which calls now for reassessing the balance between these two 
functions within the NCB governance model:  
Before the crisis, under an orthodox monetary policy framework, the answer to MrCarujana’s question would 
have been quite simple and resumed on what Davies and Green (2010, p. 10) called "the central bank model before 
crisis", i.e. a NCB run as a monetary policy institute consisting of a limited number of functions centered mostly 
around the inflation targeting regime, with a limited involvement in financial system, motivated by the fact that 
“financial stability is a territory between monetary and prudential supervision" ( Padoa-Schioppa , 2004, p. 2). 
But, what happened after the crisis, when the current monetary policy framework proves to be insufficient to 
support both functions of stability? Stark asked in 2009 for a deeper development of the analytical framework of the 
macro-prudential mandate. In 2010, three years after the crisis, Stella (2010) and Goodhart (2010) discussed about 
an institutional separation between monetary policy and financial stability policy.Croitoru (2013, p.24) considered 
this idea as "questionable from various points of view” and provides not only five arguments against this separation 
of the NCB governance model, but also an “elegant” solution (p26) to "democratize quasi-fiscal operations led by 
the central bank" (p26). In 2012, Isarescu, the Romanian central bank governor, advanced the idea that "securing 
price stability is a condition (almost) enough to promote financial stability; by providing low levels of inflation, 
NCBs play a decisive role in financial stability and economic growth sustainability" (Isarescu, 2012, p.2); lately, in 
October 2014, Isarescu reinforced this idea in the sense that price stability does not guarantee financial stability, 
often associated with excessive increase of credit and with the appearance of assets bubbles; and that is the reason 
why he called for a "net separation between maintaining price stability function and financial stability function, in 
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order to simplify the policy design and implementation, by avoiding conflicts among objectives", furthermore 
pleading for "integrating both functions in a single institution"- institutional integration. In June 2014, Weidmann,in 
an inspirational speech called “all for one and one for all", explained the “herculean task” of safeguarding financial 
stability: “adopting financial stability as an additional monetary policy objective on a par with price stability 
overstates the accuracy and the effectiveness with which monetary policy can contribute to financial stability. And 
ultimately it runs the risk of harming credibility with regard to the pursuit of price stability, as this depends on both 
monetary policy clarity regarding its objectives and transparency regarding its limitations” (p.2).It becomes clear 
that the process of reshaping the NCB governance model needs institutional progress: “making progress will require 
the recognition that both price and financial stability are essential ingredients of the monetary systems of well-
functioning economies, and that they are in fact two aspects of the same public good” (Carujana, 2014). 
Rebalancing these two functions inside the central bank governance model implies neither to change nor to build 
up a new governance model; instead, it heads toward an institutional multilayered framework where the national 
competent authority in charge with supervision function (even that is NCB) takes up the European level that requires 
to get into a closer cooperation arrangement,from two perspectives: (i) institutionally, it has to cooperate and 
coordinate with other national and European authorities, especially with the ECB; (ii) technically, it has to get 
involved in this new European resilient and supervisory stronger architecture and to get a deep understanding of the 
whole project. Perhaps, in the first months of its implementation, the SSM (the BU-first pillar) does not look like a 
unified coalition, and needs more patience as it is still a work in progress; however, the real change will happen 
when the shift from the national to the European level will convince the NCB Board toreassess the role played by 
theseintertwined functions and to reshape  the institutional balance of power in order to make the governance model 
more inclusive and to allow for a more effective coordination in financial area.    
4. The purpose of institutional adaptation of the central bank governance model – improving cooperation 
through the central bank’s international relations function  
If in the last three decades of the 20th century central banking literature focused largely on the study of central 
bank independence and monetary policy instruments, the 21st century literature has started advocating for the need 
to adapt the NCB governance model beyond old-time fashion status quo in order to face the new unconventional 
realities, i.e. to be creative enough to innovate in those areas where the governance could become vulnerable and 
dysfunctional. These areas has occurred where and when institutional integration does not follow the speed and the 
path of financial integration, creating a mismatch between the challenges of integration and the NCB capacity to 
deal with these growing challenges; at some point in time it could threatto turn into a vicious circle if the NCB is not 
developing a more appropriate cooperation framework. This action is especially needed for some ex-communist 
non-euro MSs newcomers that lost the democratic tradition of alternation in power as well as the practice promoting 
inter-institutional coordination policies, questioning adaptability of the whole public system and the willingness for 
cooperation.This gap between desirability and feasibility proves that developing a more appropriate and effective 
policy coordination through cooperation both political and policy-related catching-up process that needs to be 
strengthened simultaneously on the following two directions: 
Consensualex-ante coordinationamong multiple institutions for implementing major EU projectsto enhance the 
capacity of non-euro NCBs to absorb the ongoing EMU reform and to spur a positive national-coordinated feedback 
loop in the main European projectswith a large political component (such as joining the BU and the euro adoption). 
Actions in the pursuit of this objective should be mindful of the need to ensure a long-term political consensus for a 
sustainable implementation at the national level. Importantly, developing a platform of mutual ex-ante inter-
institutional coordinationfor joining BU, as a preparatory-stage for the next natural stage - the euro adoption - should 
be considered among national priorities and part of a big and undesirable national long-term political and economic 
project. Anon-euro NCB could get involved up to a certain level, which requires a clarification of division of labor, 
in accordance with European and national legal legislation. In the first stage, there will be rather a political 
temptation than a hesitation to give NCB the leading role within this platform of inter-institutional coordination, and 
thus, a delegation of responsibility, staking on its huge national institutional credibility. However, in order to ensure 
a return of the natural ownership to national authorities (Government and Parliament), a non-euro NCB has to make 
clear its legal constraints that restraint it from assuming an active role in building up and gaining political consensus 
for any EU political-driven project implementation at the national level. This consensual platform of cooperation 
provides a good opportunity at the politicians hand to prioritise the euro adoption as the most important 
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nationaleconomic project, and to accelerate the work on intermediate stages, such as the BU implementation, in 
order to keep a well-balanced network of power in the long run. 
Coordination through cooperationis typically performed in most of the non-euro MSs in a more centralized 
institutional manner,with the key purpose to institutionalize the concentration of power in one pole and without to 
necessary create a strong link among institutions involved inpreparatory work of the European affairs files. A better 
policy design for this type of cooperation could envisage more focus on coordination policy. It includes appropriate 
tools, specific and carefully targeted to allow an effective inter-institutional cooperation of the NCB with 
Government, Parliament, etc., and to enhance the overall political accountability for implementation of those EU 
political driven-projects. Thus, the NCBs will be better insulated by Government, working together than acting 
purely individually. Rebalancing the international relations function means for these non-euro NCBs the opportunity 
to get back to its original role from accession times i.e. to create synergies for better ex-ante coordination and to 
enhances conditions for protection against possible shocks. Risks and uncertainties could mainly come from non-
euro NCBs whose institutional system of the past 25 years is not yet well prepared to face the tasks of implementing 
the major European system (such as BU and/or the euro adoption) cross-border coordination through cooperation. 
That is why this paper insists on the need to improvethe NCBs ex-ante coordination with allnational authorities and 
with allrelevant European authorities (the EU, the Council, etc.)simultaneously on (i) the macroeconomic policies 
and(ii) capacity development as a crucial part of its governance model. 
Once these conditions for improving the ex-ante coordination framework are created, the adaptation of the 
governance model (especially for non-euro NCBs) could take the form of changing the perspective from a local, 
national view to a European overview for both experts involved in decision-making process and members of the 
NCBs decision-making bodies. The key role in this changing process plays the international relations function which 
could facilitate: (i) a more pro-active involvement in negotiating arenas at Brussels and Frankfurt (moving from the 
status of policy takers to policy makers), (ii) an opening approach for developing cooperation within the ESCB 
framework based on bilateral or multilateral consultations with the ECB and with other NCBs for drafting common 
arguments or common positions on certain topics, or research studies and exchange of views on issues of common 
interest in the European affairs and, (iii) a focus on improving internal (inside NCB) and external (outside NCB) 
coordination. As long as the NCB cannot play an active role in reaching national political consensus, it however 
may have the ability to steer a national consensualization platform for both rapid implementation of the EU 
decisions and effective coordination to consistently represent the MS position on specific negotiation files. In the 
other words, the adaptation in this particular case of the NCB international relations function is about how to 
manage the change in the governance model under the conditions of rapid high-speed change of perspective (from 
local, national view to a more European view), of strategy (which involves not only the experts but also the 
decision-makers) and of framework (from a decentralized to a more European integrative-type of governance). 
5. The purpose of institutional adaptation of the central bank governance model – reassessing  public 
perception about central bank between credibility and flexibility  
Starting from the idea that the NCB institutional effectiveness is a compromise, in the best sense of the word, 
between credibility and flexibility, we investigate whether, in these unconventional times, there is a need for 
reassessing public perception about the NCBs decisions, actions and messages. Below are discussed some of the 
most relevant determinants of the central bank institutional quality: 
The central bank credibility: it is well agreed that the NCBs credibility starts with "rule of law", that equally 
means the full transposition and implementation of the EU acquiscommunautaire in the national legislation and the 
full commitment for respecting it. It actually lays the foundation for enhancing the quality of the NCB governance 
modeland plays an important role in preventing a loss of credibility. 
The central bankdeliverables: The central bank credibility means the competence with which the NCB delivers 
to the public what it expects for a long-term horizon - stability and authority -, in a variety of forms: price stability 
and financial stability, authority in the decision-making process, policy control and the ability to use its specific 
instruments and to achieve other secondary objectives properly and effectively (Iling, 2006). “As the NCB 
credibility seems to be directly proportional to the degree of expectation that society is prepared to tolerate, the NCB 
may opt either for reinventing its own mandate -which requires time-, or for innovating -which require immediate 
action and skills to combine the art with the science of governing a central bank” (Mihailovici, 2014, p.120).  
The relevance of central bank legitimacy. NCBs are also structures of power that articulate and reflect 
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hierarchical relations. But what happen in the case of overlapping the credibility of the institution with the reputation 
of the one who is leading it? Some governors stood out just by their presence in a temporary function, other 
governors were noticed by conscientiousness and rigor with which they fulfilled the institutional tasks and duties 
entrusted to them, but only few governors were those who glowed through with their personality and charisma and 
step down in history as the state leaders who serve the state interest. Vicarelli (1988, p. 9) was the one who argued 
that central bank independence essentially depends on the personality of its governor so that the governor’s 
reputation fuels the NCB credibility and vice versa, in a continuous virtuous circle. In this case, the NCBs, together 
with the Ministry of Finance and other national financial institutions, enters in the position of "primus inter pares" 
(first among equals) within the framework of a national network of power poles where only one out of two 
outcomes becomes relevant: either all efforts are channeled to construct a powerful network, capable to maintain the 
balance of power among all institutional poles, or they may enter into a competitive inter-institutional status, which 
affect the long-term national state interest. In our case, the most relevant determinant of the institutional quality is 
the NCBs capability to stay and to keep the institutional balance of power. No matter how much influence a NCB 
has gained at the national level, its credibility cannot legitimate the political commitment for postponing or delaying 
structural reforms. The central bank and its governor cannot become a universal panacea or a substitute for overall 
leadership or for structural reforms, for economic growth or for increasing the standard of living. A mitization of 
such an illusion is likely to induce unrealistic expectations and to damage the NCB credibility. 
The degree of flexibility?When there is a certain degree of flexibility to accept a particular type of policy 
cooperation with the Government or a certain degree of transparency in the NCB policy communication, then it may 
be entered in areas of risk and vulnerabilities. A new challenge is facing the central bankers in the last couple of 
years: publication of the minutes of monetary policy Board meetings. To this request to increase the degree of 
transparency in communication Tognato (2005, p117), quoting Issing (1999) and Winkler (2000), have responded 
with a different type of approach generically called “multi-lingual institutional language”, which proposes, in 
essence, a diversification and a segmentation of the NCB data and information on categories of target audiences able 
to absorb, in a consistent manner, a large diversity of the NCB messages (Mihailovici, 2014, p121). 
The degree of innovation for flexibility: one suggestion of innovating the governance model of some non-euro 
NCBs could follow the Bundesbank experience, in the sense that the policy of transparency of the NCBs decision-
making process could evolve from a homogeneous category of target audience to several clusters of target audience 
(“collection of multiple audiences”), segmented according to their topics and areas of interest (Lohmann, 2003, p. 
106). “Lohmann (2003) relaxes this assumption and shows that, only by looking at the collection of multiple 
audiences attached to a monetary institution, will it be possible to fully appreciate how a well-designed monetary 
institution solves the trade-off between credibility and flexibility. For Lohmann (2003, p. 100) designing monetary 
institutions is about selecting the appropriate menu of audiences that will effectively monitor the institution and 
punish the intrusions of policymakers into the workings of the institution. The audience cost – she remarks - will 
give credibility to the policy-maker’s commitment (Tognato, 2005, p.5).  
6. Conclusions 
The global financial crisis which originated in the United States in 2007 and 2008 quickly propagated its 
effects in Europe as a result of financial markets, services and capital flows globalisation, and in particular, the 
integration of the large emerging markets into the global economy. To address these challenges, a fundamental shift 
in European economic governance became top priority for European decision-makers and it has been both 
innovative in nature and unprecedented in magnitude, calling for stronger and better economic policy co-ordination 
at the European level. Ensuring effective cooperation and coordination between all MS and efficient dialogue with 
all stakeholders, including NCBs, becomes essential in order to optimise the impacts of the ongoing EMU reforms 
implementation at the national level. This paper analysed why (the purpose) and how (the mechanism) the crisis has 
challenged the NCB governance along its key functions and the way NCBs adapts to the new unconventional 
realities, keeping its common set of similar characteristics (central bank independence and price stability), despite 
the variety of challenges occurred meanwhile. Against this background, the general conclusion is:NCBs have to 
rebalance their functions and to innovateits institutional profile order to improve the effectiveness of the whole 
governance model.  
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